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The Efﬁcient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is one of the most investigated question in
Finance. Nevertheless, it is still a scientiﬁc puzzle, despite the enormous amount of
research it has provoked: as instance, many recent results have shadowed the well-
establishedbeliefthatmarketcannotbeoutperformedonthelongrun(seeasinstance
Detry and Gregoire (2001)); an other reason is that persistent market anomalies can-
not be easily explained in this theoretical framework (Shiller 2003). One can also
consider that some talented hedge-fund managers (like Jim Simons) seem to earn
excess risk-adjusted rates of returns since years. Nevertheless, this last point does
not reach any consensus today (Malkiel 2003).
Many formulations of the EMH have been proposed since Samuelson founding work
(Samuelson 1965). We concentrate in this paper on the weak form of efﬁciency
(Fama 1970) : “past informations are useless to predict future price changes”. We
therefore focus on the proﬁtability of simple technical trading rules following in that
Jensen and Benington (1969) or more recently Brock, Lakonishock, and LeBaron
(1992). An extensive survey for this ﬁeld is proposed in Park and Irwin (2004).
Nevertheless, we depart from previous works in many points : we ﬁrst have a large
population of technical, virtual agents (more than 2.6 millions) exploiting real-world
data to manage a ﬁnancial portfolio as chartists or technical traders would do. Very
few researches have used such an enormous amount of calculus to check the EMH.
Our experimental design allow for agents selection based on past absolute perfor-
mance, as well as stability in performance. Of course, we take into account the data-
snooping risk, which is an unavoidable problem in such broad-spectrum works, using
a rigorous bootstrap Reality Check procedure (White 2000).
Whereas market inefﬁciencies, when including transaction costs, cannot clearly be
successfully exploited, our experiments present troubling outcomes like persistent
(butnotstatisticallysigniﬁcantatcommonlyadmittedlevels)overperformanceinvit-
ing to consider again more closely the weak-form EMH.
This short version is organized as follows: section 1 presents our multi-agent system
(MAS) and experimental design, section 2 brieﬂy sum-up our results.2 Olivier BRANDOUY and Philippe MATHIEU
1 Methodology
In this section we give the main features of our experimental design including the
global MAS architecture, descriptions of the agents, and the statistical procedure
aimed to detect potential market inefﬁciencies.
1.1 MAS architecture
In this experiment, agents represent virtual investors trading one ﬁnancial commod-
ity called a tracker”. As it is generally admitted (Wooldridge 2002), the agents’
fundamental characteristics in this study are an idiosyncratic decision-making pro-
cess, autonomy, and reactivity to context changes. Our MAS is based on a three-stage
architecture; at each stage, one can consider a kind of agents with speciﬁc aims or
logic:
First stage: Strategic Agents are micro-agents playing always the same basic strat-
egy through the entire simulation. Those basic strategies are known in the ﬁ-
nancial community as “technical trading rules”. As instance, a Strategic-agent
:“5-days moving average” cannot process any other operation and decide to
trade or not her tracker on the basis given by her single rule.
Second stage: Family Agents are general agents deﬁning all the formal characteris-
tics used in the instantiation of each Strategic Agent. Each Family Agent has also
to perform a ranking between each of his “children” at each time step. The Fam-
ily Agent has thus the capacity to select the most successful individuals in the
Strategic Agents population.
Third Stage: Meta Agents are able to mimic the behavior of various Strategic Agents
according to the circumstances and the ranking given by the relevant Family
Agents.Asinstance,aMetaAgent basedonthe2-uple{Momentum,Triangle}
will choose and mimic various instances of those Family Agents, considering
some signals. We do not develop this point in this short version nor report re-
sults concerning this category of agents.
To get it clearer, let’s consider one Family Agent : “Periodical Trader”. This agent
buys and sells the trackers at ﬁxed periods. She is similar to speculators buying on
Mondays and selling on Fridays. This agent has at least two parameters coding the
datesatwhichshewillbuyandsellhertrackers.Ifshedecidestogenerateallpossible
Strategic Agents using all possible delays between 1 and 100, 10.000 “children” will
be processed.
1.2 Agent’s design
As it has been presented previously, we have implemented a large population of
heterogeneous agents (2.621.932 agents, see Table 1). Such massive experiment has
never been performed before, to our point of view.
Allowed operations and behavior: Each agent is allowed to trade n tracker (n ∈
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Table 1. Agents Population
Family Agent Num. Strategic Agents
Periodical Trader {n,p} 2.500.000
Indicator Trader {n,p} 13.928
Rectangle Trader {n,m,p,s} 57.566
Triangle Trader {n,m,p,s} 4.303
Variation Trader {n,m,p} 19.960
Momentum Trader {n,p} 1.485
Moving Average Trader {n,p} 1.987
Weighted Moving Average Trader {n,p,s} 1.990
RSI Trader {n,p} 20.712
Buy & Hold Trader 1
CAC40, Dow-Jones or Nikkei). If she has not decided to hold such commodities, the
agent holds cash. Therefore, each agent is in one of these situations:
• she possesses a number of trackers > 0; in this situation we say the “Agent is in
the market”. Her wealth ﬂuctuates along the market.
• shedoes not haveanytracker or fraction of tracker, all her wealth being converted
in cash; the “Agent is out-of the market” and her wealth is stable. No risk-free
asset paying a low interest rate is available.
At each time step, agents receive a new information and have to decide if it is worth
staying in the market or getting out : they follow systematically the signals given by
their technical rules. As instance, a Strategic Agent designed as a “moving average 5,
5” analyzes at each iteration if the 5 days moving average of past prices has crossed
thepriceprocessinthe top-downdirection,whichcorrespond toa“sell-signal” (resp.
bottom-up and “buy-signal”). In this situation, if the gap between the 5-days moving
average and the price is greater than 5%, she will “sell” (resp. “buy”). If the gap is
under 5%, she will stay unchanged considering her portfolio. Each Strategic Agent
possesses the same kind of behavior with various chartist or technical rules. Never-
theless, one has to notice than one singular agent follows systematically a “Buy &
Hold” strategy, that is, she get in the market at time = 0 (she buys one tracker)
and let her situation unchanged until the end of the simulation. This agent is our
“benchmark” agent in terms of risk and return and stands for a “passive investor”.
Theoretically, no one can outperform this agent on the long run assuming the EMH
holds.
Each agent is endowed with the same amount of cash at the beginning of the simu-
lations. If an agent looses all her endowment during an experiment, since borrowing
is avoided, she is withdrawn from the market.
Trading is subjected to transaction costs at a 0.5% level.
The simulations are based on real daily data from the Euronext Paris Stock Exchange
between 1988 and 2005. The traded tracker perfectly replicates the CAC40 index.
Agents have only access to past values of this tracker, and the information they re-4 Olivier BRANDOUY and Philippe MATHIEU
ceive at each time-step is the price of the tracker corresponding to the current itera-
tion (no agent is “cheating” and behave knowing what the “future” will be).
1.3 Organization of the simulations
Simulations are organized in two steps:
Stage 1: consists in the selection of the best performing agents, compared to the
benchmark agent. This test consists in 10 simulations based on random sub-
samples from historical CAC40 observations (01/1988-07/1996). At the begin-
ning of each simulation (t = 0), Family Agents create Strategic Agents. Then
Strategic Agents begin to compete against the Buy & Hold Agent. Then Family
Agents rank their belonging sub-population of Strategic Agents, comparing their
performances to that of the benchmark agent. Once the 10 simulations have been
processed, Strategic Agents having out-performed the benchmark at least in 50%
of the simulations are selected. Performance is always appreciated in terms of
risk-return : a Strategic Agents outperform the Buy & Hold Agent if and only
if she obtains a more than proportional return considering the risk she has been
exposed during the simulation. “Risk” is calculated as the standard deviation of
the agent’s portfolio, “return” being the average rate of growth of her wealth.
Stage 2: consists in a generalization of the ﬁrst stage on new data –historical CAC40
observations(08/1996-04/2005)–.FamilyAgentsonlycreatetheStrategicAgents
selected at the ﬁrst step. Then the same competitive process against the Buy
& Hold Agent is processed again but on 200 sub-samples of the new data. In
this last stage, Family Agents select Strategic Agents having out-performed the
benchmark at least in 75% of the simulations.
We then apply a statistical procedure called Bootstrap Reality Check proposed by
White (2000) to decide whether or not the “winners” in this last race have out-
performed the benchmark, that is, if they have out-performed the market exploiting
weak-form inefﬁciencies.
2 Results
We have selected in this short version some basic results among a large set of inter-
sting experimental outcomes that we will describe in the full paper; a ﬁrst series of
ﬁgures reports part of them, directly linked to the simulations presented previously:
Results for Stage 1: 6.057 Strategic Agents have out-performed the Buy & Hold
Agent in more than 50% of the simulations. They come from all the Family
Agents. The selection rate over the initial population is between 5.10−5% and
1.7%, which is very low, but “as expected”. One has to keep in mind that our
procedure involves a huge number of agents; it is perfectly normal than some of
them seem to perform well at this initial step.A Broad-Spectrum Computational Approach for Market Efﬁciency 5
Results for Stage 2: After the second selection process, only 19 Strategic Agents
have out-performed the benchmark agent. They all come from two Family
Agents : “Rectangle Trader” and “Variation Trader”. Some of them have out-
performed the benchmark agent for each of the 200 simulations.
We have then applied carefully White’s Reality Check over 500 bootstrap series to
control potential spurious results. Although the simulations seem to be very harsh
in terms of selectivity for “good candidates”, we cannot reject the null “The best
Strategic Agents cannot out-perform the Buy & Hold Agent” at ordinary p-values –
p-value=28.2%–. Therefore we cannot reject the initial weak-form EMH and cannot
report evident market inefﬁciencies for those data with basic Strategic Agents using
simple trading rules. This result seems therefore to be a strong support for the weak-
form efﬁciency of the French Market.
Nevertheless, two interesting points have to be underlined here :
- We have applied the same experimental process using randomly generated data
(CAC40 having been replaced with a computerized index following a “random
walk”). By construction, these data do not “hide” any useful information at date t
allowing to predict t + 1. Thus, they perfectly replicate the behavior of an efﬁcient
market index. No Strategic Agents is able in this last simulated context to pass the
ﬁlters we have settled-up, while it is easily done by many of them on real-world data.
This is a ﬁrst troubling result.
- The last point is related to the performance of the Meta-Agents that could allow us
to reject H0, but this last point has still to be investigated further.
In the full version, we will show how our MAS can mimic complex real-world in-
vestors and achieve results that can challenge seriously the weak-form EMH.
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